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CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A TRUSTEE
INVESTS TRUST FUNDS
JOHN

M.

HADsAL*

T

HE trustee has come to occupy a position in the modern world that is of vastly wider scope than was his
status when the law of trusts was first being nurtured by
equity. That law has been amazingly permanent and
consistent in its fundamental concepts of duties. On this
stable foundation the trust function has spread until it is
omnipresent, and has grown to represent a sizeable fraction of the total of invested capital. The new importance
of the corporate trustee is one of the most obvious manifestations of this development. Still, no matter how large
the trustee, or how involved his financial dealings, the
relation remains a fiduciary one, and, moreover, the
fiduciary element is more intense than with other fiduciaries. What the law will say when any interest other
than the beneficiary's enters into an investment transaction must be constantly kept in mind. A review of
decisions on this subjet impresses one that the trustee's
path is narrow at best; sometimes he seems to be unduly
restrained or the course approved for him appears excessively cumbersome compared with modern business
conduct. It is proposed to observe in what situations the
courts have decided that the interjection of the trustee's
individual interest into the making of a trust investment
results in a breach of trust; then to review the remedies
available to the cestui if such is the case; and finally to
consider some attempts to improve this situation by
statutory provisions and the arguments for and against
the principal schemes.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF TRUST

This subject is clearly a division of the trustee's duty
of loyalty. The exclusion of all selfish interest is one of
*Alumnus
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the most fundamental characteristics of a trust. The
commonly accepted inability of any person to serve two
masters would be expected to be applied to him whom
the law places on a much higher level of integrity than is
demanded of the crowd. The United States Supreme
Court in the early case of Michoud v. Girod1 expressed
this attitude of equity in language which has become
classic, including:
In this conflict of interest the law wisely interposes. ... It
...provides against the probability in many cases, and the
danger in all cases, that the dicates of self-interest will exercise a predominant influence, and supersede that of duty.
It therefore prohibits a party from purchasing on his own
account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell on
account of another, and from purchasing on account of another
that which he sells on his own account. In effect, he is not allowed
to unite the two opposite characters of buyer and seller, because his interests, when he is the seller or buyer on his own
account, are directly conflicting with those of the person on
whose account he buys or sells.
The trustee's first obligation to an income producing
trust is obviously to make proper investments. He is
definitely under a duty to make the trust property productive, but in doing so he is req ired to manifest the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence of an ordinarily prudent person engaged in similar affairs who is investing
for the benefit of others for whom he feels morally bound
to provide. No amount of good faith will excuse him
from this, nor will the taking of advice. To these are
added the limitations applied by the settlor, the court,
and statutes. There is also a tendency toward holding
professional trustees to a still higher degree of skill and
prudence, apparently because they profess to be capable
of it.2 So it appears that the modern corporate trustee
has much reason for exercising caution in making invest1 4 How. (U. S.) 503, 11 L. Ed. 1076 (1846).
2 In re Clark's Will, 242 N. Y. S. 210 (1930) ; In re Allis' Estate, 191
Wis. 23, 209 N. W. 945 (1926). But see In re Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32,
148 A. 912 (1930).
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ments and for using all the facilities it has at its disposal.
Under such restrictions, the exclusion of all possible
individual interest of the trustee from investment transactions is not a negligible problem. An imposing line of
cases has uniformly held that it is improper for the trustee to purchase its own securities, regardless of fairness
and good faith. It is likewise a breach of trust to invest
trust funds in the individual name of the trustee, as the
Illinois case of White v. Sherman3 decided. Although the
situation seldom arises, a trustee who buys an incumbrance upon any trust property is chargeable with any
profit made thereby.
The unyielding rigidity with which the courts have
clung to this doctrine is well illustrated by decisions from
4
Minnesota. In St. Paul Trust Company v. Strong et al.,
the beneficiaries of a trust fund objected to certain notes
secured by real estate mortgages when the trustee
brought action to have its first account settled and adjusted. The facts were that the trustee had at different
times owned these notes in its corporate capacity. The
court struck out the amounts thereof and so surcharged
the account. The Supreme Court, in affirming, found it
to be settled that in such a case no fraud in fact need be
shown, and no excuse can be offered by the trustee to
justify such transactions. The appellant did not dispute
the rule but contended that it did not apply here because,
under the statute under which it was organized and was
acting, the interest of beneficiaries and that of trustees
could not conflict. The court remarked that the statute
threw around such organizations rigorous regulations
and had imposed liabilities of a very stringent character,
but it found therein no expression of an intention to make
a radical departure from this established doctrine. The
opinion states that if such had been the legislature's in3 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897).
4 85 Minn. 1, 88 N. W. 256 (1901).
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tention, "it would have expressly provided that investments might be made by trust companies in securities
The restrictions
held and owned by such companies."
their pato
safeguard
and obligations were introduced
trons and were not designed for the benefit or advantage
of the organizations therein provided for. The court
suggested that if an obligor became reduced in circumstances or a defense against the trustee in particular
was threatened, the inducement would be strong to transfer such securities to the trust, although their actual
money value might still remain unquestioned and answer
in every way to the statutory requirements.
Several years later the court disposed of a similar
controversy in the same way in the case of In re Security
Bank & Trust Company.5 The former opinion was
handed down in 1901. Knowing of that decision, the legislature failed to follow the language quoted above when
it amended that statute in 1903, but provided that any
amount not less than one hundred dollars received by a
trustee, "it shall invest so soon as practicable in authorized securities, either then held by it or specially procured by it." This court, in 1929, said the failure to
follow the language of the earlier case, "held and
owned," showed a contrary intent, and decided that the
word "held" should be construed in the sense in which
it is found elsewhere in the trust company laws, i.e.
"hold property in trust," meaning having in possession
and under control property (not its own) for others.
Thus, the conclusion was reached that the only effect of
the amendment was to furnish grounds for an inference
that a trustee can now sell secuities from one of its
trusts to another. However, permitting even this practice would seem to be an equally radical departure from
established principles, and the language is hardly adequate for the purpose if construction is to be so strict.
5 178 Minn. 209, 224 N. W. 235 (1929).
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This situation illustrates that when a legislature wishes
to modify the obligations of trustees to conform to the
practical business world, it must leave nothing to the
imagination of the courts; but Minnesota appears to be
satisfied, as that language still remains unaltered."
New York has furnished some relief to trust companies,
at least, from the burden of this restriction by the amendment of 1917 to the Banking Law. The Appellate Division pointed out in the case of In re Flint's Will7 that the
former phrase, "no trustee shall purchase securities
hereunder from himself," was thereby deleted, and a corporate trustee was authorized to deal with itself in a
limited way in good faith. However, the court noted that
that language had been retained in amendments enacted
the same day to the Personal Property Law8 and the Decedent Estate Law,9 so the prohibition continues to apply to an individual trustee. The important language of
the Banking Law is,
Investments in bond and mortgage by any such corporation
as... trustee, . . . may be made by apportioning to any estate
or fund held by such corporation in any of such capacities a
part interest in a bond and mortgage held by or in the name
of such corporation, individually or in any representative
capacity ... and such corporation shall promptly notify each
person of full age and sound mind entitled to the income therefrom of the fact that such investment has been made.10
A trust company, however, found to its sorrow, in the
case of In re Roche's Will,1 that this language authorizes
investment of trust funds in mortgage participations
only, and its account was surcharged with the amounts of
certain entire bonds and mortgages which it had sold
to the trust estate.
6 Minn. St., sec. 7738.

269 N. Y. S. 470 (1934).
8 Consol. Laws, c. 41, sec. 21.
9 Consol. Laws, c. 13, sec. 111.
10 Consol. Laws, c. 2, sec. 188, subd. 7.
11 281 N. Y. S. 77 (1935).
7
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The statutes of the District of Columbia and Ohio
also contain express prohibitions against a trustee selling
investments to trusts. The Indiana statute does not expressly forbid such transactions, but on the other hand
expressly prohibits the bank or trust company from
making a profit on a sale to or purchase from the trust,
and gives such profit, if made, to the trust.' 2 Wyoming,
on the other hand, has completely swept away the fiduciary doctrine with the language,
Any such corporation may transfer to trust estates without
incurring any other legal liability than as if such transfer were
made by a third person, any mortgages or other securities
owned by it which comply with the requirements of legal
investments for trust funds under the statutes.' 3
The traditional doctrine is no less severe against a
trustee using trust property for his own purposes or
taking for himself any profit, bonus or commission from
a trust transaction other than his stipulated compensation. He is always chargeable with any separate benefit
so realized. The leading case on this subject is Magruder
v. Drury.'4 There a trustee purchased notes from the
firm of real estate brokers of which he was a partner.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia for allowing him
the commission, saying,
It makes no difference that the estate was not a loser in the
transaction, or that the commission was no more than the
services were reasonably worth. It is the relation of the
trustee to the estate which prevents his dealing in such a way
as to make a personal profit for himself ....

While no wrong

was intended, and none was in fact done to the estate, we
think nevertheless that upon the principles governing the duty
of a trustee, the contention that this profit could not be taken
by Mr. Drury, owing to his relation to the estate, should have
been sustained.
12
13
14

Laws of 1933, c. 40, sec. 189.
Rev. St. 1931, sec. 10-403, subd. 12.
235 U. S. 106, 59 L. Ed. 151 (1914).
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In the case of White v. Sherman, mentioned above, the
trustee, holding trust property to be insured, joined an
underwriters' association and thus secured a commission
on the premiums paid. The Illinois court required him to
account for it, even though the trust estate suffered no
loss by the transaction. The reason for the forbidding of
separate profits seems too obvious for much discussion.
Much more than the prohibition against the trustee's being both buyer and seller does the rule against separate
profits shield estates from the mercies of over-astute
business men. However, as with other long-condemned
practices, some still attempt to succeed in it. As recently
as 1935, in Bold v. Mid-City Trust and Savings Bank,1"
a trust company acted as trustee under mortgage loans
sold to a trust and charged the owners of the properties
fees for certifying the bonds and also received commissions; it placed insurance on the properties, charging
the owners the full premiums, and received rebates from
the insurance companies; it also retained discounts on
guarantee policies, and placed all these sums in its general funds. Needless to say, such dealings came under
the condemnation of the Illinois Appellate Court.
Not every conflict of interest, however, is so clear cut.
If a trustee may not, say, lend money to himself, the
courts would be quick to recognize such an artifice as a
trustee's organizing a dummy corporation and making
a loan to it from the trust property. But it does not follow that trust investments may not concern any corporation in which he has an interest however slight. And the
fact that his interest is considerable is not conclusive
that a court will not approve the transaction, if it finds
that the trust is adequately protected. In Cornet v.
Cornet,8 the trustee owned one-half of the stock of a
real estate company. Loans were made to this firm, but
15 279 Ill. App. 365 (1935).
16 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (1916).
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no commissions were paid. The Missouri court said that
the personal credit of the trustee had nothing to do with
the security. The law surrounded the corporate entity
with a credit founded upon its own capital, and the
landed security was all that would be exacted from a
stranger. It was remarked that the situation did not
differ intrinsically from the purchase of a bond of a railway company in which the trustee was a stockholder. The
court refused to assess compound interest in the absence
of a showing of what the trustee's profits were, and concluded from every fair test that these particular investments were beyond reproach. On the other hand, in
Birmingham v. Wilcox, 17 the California court held that a
trustee investing funds of a trust estate in bonds of a corporation, of which he was an organizer, stockholder, and
director, dealt with the funds to his own advantage within the express prohibition of the Civil Code.
Not many of the states have dealt with this particular
matter by statutory enactment. Tennessee, however, attempts to be really "practical" with it. Her statute provides that no fiduciary shall purchase for investment of
trust funds securities from any corporation in wbich he
or it (or its stockholders, if a corporation) owns twentyfive per cent or more of the stock unless such security
was purchased or acquired by such affiliated corporation
within sixty days prior to the sale to the trust, and the
gross profit or commission realized by such corporation
from the sale shall not exceed one and one-half per
centum of the price paid.18
A closely parallel question is whether a corporate
trustee can properly deposit in its banking department
funds which it holds as trustee. As for an individual
fiduciary, Genesee Wesleyan Seminary v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company"9 held that one such was
120 Cal. 467, 52 P. 822 (1898).
18 Pub. Acts 1931, c. 100, sec. 2.
19 247 N. Y. 52, 159 N. E. 720 (1928).
17
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guilty of embezzlement when he deposited trust money in
a private bank owned by him. The case of a corporate
trustee is definitely distinct, and it is undoubtedly a
common practice. Still, one line of cases holds that it is
using funds to the trustee's advantage and so it is liable
either for full legal interest 0 or for a proportionate
share of the profit made by it on its loans.2 Several
cases, on the other hand, have refused to impose such
liability and require only such interest as the trust company ordinarily pays on deposits.2
In Pennsylvania a regulation of the state banking department requires that uninvested trust funds shall be
deposited in some other institution properly earmarked
as trust funds. Expressive of the other theory, the California statute provides that the trust department of any
bank doing a departmental business, holding funds awaiting investment or distribution, may deposit such with the
savings department or the commercial department of the
same corporation or association, on condition that the
latter first set aside, as security for such deposit, securities, legal for savings banks, to a value not less than the
funds so deposited.3 The New York Banking Law has
a still different effect, in that it requires a trust company
to pay interest at not less than 2 per cent on all sums of
money not less than one hundred dollars collected and
24
received by it as trustee.
The better reasoning appears to be that which concludes that the corporate trustee's deposit of trust funds
in its own banking department is not really a use of the
trust funds in the trust company's own business for
which it should answer with all its profits. Independent
20 Enright v. Sedalia Trust Co., 323 Mo. 1043, 20 S. W. (2d) 517; Union
Trust Co. v. Preston Nat. Bank, 144 Mich. 106, 107 N. W. 1109 (1906).
21 St. Paul Trust Co. v. Kittson, 62 Minn. 408, 65 N. W. 74 (1895).
22 Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 119 A. 341 (1923).
23 Gen. Laws 1931, Act 652, sec. 105.
24 Banking Law, sec. 188 (11).
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of the persuasive pragmatic considerations, the latter
view may be justified on the theory that the trustee purchased the trust funds, that is the trust res, and has
given the estate in exchange a legal claim against itself
for the amount of the funds and for interest accruable.
It will be remembered that a purchase of the trust res by
the trustee is only presumptively voidable when the
cestui has knowledge of it, and the transaction will be
sustained if there is no possibility that it could prejudice
the interest of the cestui. As a practical matter there
obviously could be no more convenient depositary for all
concerned, and it is as much subject to state law and
supervision as any other. It would not seem unreasonable to hold that the settlor who appoints a corporate
trustee impliedly authorizes it to deposit temporary
funds with itself. Furthermore, in one material respect
the practice adds to the protection given to the estate.
That is, assuming that the depositary becomes insolvent,
is not the situation in which it is the trustee more advantageous than that in which it is a third party? Knowledge
of its own condition certainly may be imputed to it, and
long before its i n dcing insolvency il will be .unier
a duty to withdraw the deposit. If it fails to do so, its
case is not dissimilar to that of a bank which receives
deposits after it knows itself to be insolvent, and then
equity will enforce a constructive trust upon the funds if
they can be identified. Almost all of the statutes take
care of the latter element. The advantages as well as the
efficiency of this practice certainly seem to outweigh the
intangible benefits of an unyielding application of an
abstract principle of law.
COSENT
In these as well as other breaches of trust it is possible
that the conduct of the beneficiary has been such as to
prevent him from holding the trustee liable, because it
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would be unfair to do so. The first requisite of this defense is that the beneficiary who has so induced or approved the action be competent to act at the time; that is,
that he be of full age and sound mind. Of course one
cestui cannot affect another's right in this regard.
Having the necessary capacity, the beneficiary must be
shown to have had at the time full knowledge of both
the facts and the law. The principle has never been
better expressed than by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in White v. Sherman, 2 5 where the court said:
In order to bind a cestui que trust by acquiesence in a breach
of trust by the trustee, it must appear that the cestui que trust
knew all the facts, and was apprised of his legal rights, and was
under no disability to assert them. Such proof must be full and
satisfactory. The cestui que trust must be shown, in such case,
to have acted freely, deliberately and advisedly, with the intention of confirming a transaction which he knew, or might or
ought, with reasonable or proper diligence, to have known to be
impeachable.... The trustee is bound to know what his own duty
is, and cannot throw upon the cestui que trust the obligation of
telling him what such duty is.
To be protected in this way, the trustee must see that
the- beneficiary has knowledge of the facts, and in giving
notice that the trust is being exposed to an independent
interest of the trustee's, he must set forth all the details
of the transaction completely. It will be noted that the
section of the New York Banking Law quoted above
includes this requirement, and the courts of that state
have held that it is one of the essential elements intended
and imposed by the statute. The accounts of trust companies have been surcharged for failure to give notice
26
that was adequate and prompt.
Consent that is binding may of course come from another source, that is, it may be expressed in the instrument creating the trust. It is quite common to find pro25 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128(1897).
26 In re Roche's Will, 281 N. Y. S. 77 (1935) ; In re Peene's Will, 279
N. Y. S.131 (1935).
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visions in trust instruments that the trustee is to be held
to standards of care and skill lower than regularly set
by equity. Likewise, by the terms of the trust, the trustee
may be permitted to sell trust property to himself individually, or as trustee to purchase property from himself, or to lend to himself money held by him in trust, or
otherwise to deal with the trust property on his own
account. Such stipulations have been held valid on the
ground that it is within the powers of the settlor to impose terms and conditions upon his gift as well as select
the agency to execute it. However, dictated by considerations of public policy, the law fixes limits beyond which
the parties cannot agree to relieve a trustee from liability
for breach of trust duties. He will still be deemed to
have violated his duty to the beneficiary if his conduct
amounts to gross negligence or indicates bad faith, no
matter how broad may be the provisions conferring
power upon him to deal on his own account. The limits
so fixed on express consent were not deemed by the
legislature of Ohio to be sufficiently restrictive. It was
consequently provided by statute that "fiduciaries shall
not buy from or sell to tlhemselves nor shall they in their
individual capacities have any dealings with the estate,
any power in the instrument creating the trust to the
contrary notwithstanding. "17
Regardless of express waiver in the trust agreement,
a trustee, realizing the limitations imposed by the courts,
may be placed in the difficult position of being required
at its peril to forecast the court's opinion of the course
it pursues when faced with a conflict of interests. This is
especially true when one course might result in a substantial loss to the trustee, which, as the court might
subsequently decide, need not have been incurred. The
recent case of In re Balfe's Will2" is one good illustration.
27

1931 Probate Code, sec. 10506-49.

2s 280 N. Y. S. 128 (1935).
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The testator's will read:
I furthermore authorize and direct that my said Executor
and Trustee may freely act under all or any of the powers by
this Will given in all matters concerning my estate and trusts
herein created without the necessity of obtaining the consent
or permission of any person interested therein or the consent
or approval of any court, notwithstanding that such Executor
and Trustee may also be acting or interested either individually
or as trustee of other trusts or as agent for other persons or
corporations interested in the same matters.
The majority of the New York court held that the Title
Guarantee & Trust Company was not liable for the loss
sustained through its holding thereunder stock in itself
and an affiliated company against a constantly falling
market, as it had been honest and acted in good faith.
These judges were convinced that that clause had deprived the estate of the benefit of the doctrine forbidding
trustees from acting under circumstances involving
"divided loyalty," but that it was not against public
policy, nor did it involve doing anything malum in se
or malum prohibitm. It had simply made case law and
statutory safeguards inapplicable, the only protection
left to the estate being the trustee's honesty and good
faith.
There was, however, a very strong dissenting opinion,
expressing the view of two of the five judges, which held
that there was nothing in the foregoing grant of power
which conveyed the idea that "divided loyalty" was
authorized. The trustee was here buying for its own
benefit during a falling market and therefore could give
no consideration to the advisability of selling. If it had
sold the stocks in these trust estates, even if such sales
were gradually made, the inevitable result would be to
decrease the market prices of the stocks of the companies
and ,in all likelihood impair their business, which in the
larger measure depended upon public confidence. Although not charging the trustee with bad faith as a mat-
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ter of fact, the purchase of these stocks was a breach of
trust duty as a matter of law, and so, the dissenting
opinion concludes, it should have been surcharged from
the time when it deprived itself of free and unhampered
action. Of course, no speculation as to which result the
testator would have chosen can be conclusive; his language was certainly broad enough to cover this situation.
But should that breadth be binding upon the courts?
The consideration of such a case and the conflicting dilemma in which the trustee found itself impels one to
the conclusion that some such statutory provision as
that of Ohio quoted above, although perhaps not so allinclusive in terms, would be the best policy.
REMEDIES

There are various remedies available to cestuis que
trust for breaches of the duties we are considering. They
are not unique, as they may be available in breaches of
trust of totally different sorts. Of course these remedies
are almost exclusively equitable. It is entirely possible
that equity will use its injunctive powers, as, where the
trustee threatens to violate the trust with respect to his
duties as to investments, the cestui may procure a court
order that he live up to his obligations. Specific performance of a duty may also be granted in a proper case,
such as where the trustee should convert investments but
insists on holding them. The discretion of the court may
prompt it to remove the trustee as well where it is convinced that the interests of the estate will then be more
surely safeguarded. 9
Equity will also exert its unique powers where the
interests of any one under an incapacity render them
appropriate. If trust funds are used to purchase property which it is the trustee's duty to refrain from pur29 Joliet Trust & Savings Bank v. Ingalls, 276 III. App. 445 (1934);

Smith v. Howlett, 51 N. Y. S. 910 (1898).
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chasing, and the beneficiary lacks capacity to make an
effective election to reject or affirm the transaction,
the court will enforce the remedy which in its opinion is
most advantageous to the beneficiary and most effective
to accomplish the purposes of the trust. If the property
has fallen in value, the court will probably reject the
purchase and charge the trustee with the amount expended with interest, while if the value has increased,
the court will ordinarily affirm. If the court decides to
affirm the purchase, it will usually require the trustee to
sell the property, as it is not a proper trust investment,
and make other investments with the proceeds.30
Any competent cestui que trust has a similar election
to reject the purchase or affirm it. The former is in
effect simply voiding the transaction, and the trustee is
compelled to replace the amount of the purchase price
with interest thereon. This was the relief granted by the
Iowa court in In re Riordan's Trusteeship3 and in the
Federal court case of First National Bank of St. Petersburg v. Solomon.3 2 However, as the Illinois court directed in White v. Sherman, already referred to, the
trustee must be credited with any income from the nonlegal investment which has been applied to trust purposes. He can only be held for the original principal invested together With loss of income; an anticipated gain
in principal is too speculative, unless there was a duty to
invest in a specific security. In so charging him with the
funds expended, the beneficiary is entitled to enforce an
equitable lien upon the property wrongfully purchased as
security for his claim. If the trustee purchased his own
individual property, he is chargeable with any depreciation in its value, even though he sold it at a fair value and
30 See Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 205; International Trust
Co. v. Preston, 24 Wyo. 163, 156 P. 1128 (1916) ; Hunt v. Gontrum, 80 Md.
64, 30 A. 620 (1894).
31 216 Iowa 1138, 248 N. W. 21 (1933).
32 63 F. (2d) 900 (1933).
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if it had been purchased from a third person it would
have been a proper trust investment.
Another type of remedy is the general scheme of accounting for profits. The trustee is of course chargeable
generally with anything he earns or realizes through the
administration of the trust beyond his agreed compensation. This obviously must be limited to what he actually
realizes; that is, he cannot be accountable for what he
would have realized if he had continued longer in a violation of his duty. So if he purchased securities from a
third person and resold them to himself as trustee, he
is chargeable with the additional amount received, if any.
3 a Federal
In the early case of Campbell v. Campbell"
circuit court applied this principle, saying the investment
must be regarded as the estate's from the time of the
purchase. This rule applies not only to such profits but
also to any bonus, commission, or rebate received by the
trustee, as was noted in the Magruder v. Drury4 decision quoted above and in many others. In Cornet v.
Cornet,3 5 the trustee, who loaned trust funds through his
own brokerage firm, was charged by the Missouri court
not. only with his own share but 91so with his partner's
share, of the commission received from the borrower.
As with all breaches of trust, trustees are jointly and
severally liable for breaches of duty with regard to trust
investments, although one who committed only a technical breach may claim indemnity from the active violator
or co-trustee who received the benefit of the breach. A
trustee cannot escape or reduce a liability incurred by
proving that through another violation of his trust a
profit has been earned for the estate. So, if he wrongfully purchases property, subsequently sells it at a profit,
and later uses the proceeds in another improper invest8 F. 460 (1881).
235 U. S. 106, 59 L. Ed. 151 (1914).
35 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (1916).
33
34
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ment which results in a loss, he cannot deduct the previous profit therefrom. He is both accountable for the
profit and chargeable with the loss if they were distinct
breaches of trust. The latter qualification is a source of
considerable difficulty, however. It is sometimes by no
means easy to decide whether distinct breaches have occurred, and no positive rules can be laid down as to the
relative weight to be given the various factors involved.
The claim of the cestui against the trustee for damages
for breach of trust is that of a general creditor, except
to the extent that he is entitled to enforce a constructive
trust, to place a lien upon the trustee's property, or to
hold him as a guarantor of the safety of the principal. His
claim, however, is augmented to compensate for loss of
income. For failure to invest in legal trust securities the
court may, in its sound discretion, choose to award either
simple interest, compound interest, or the average trust
investment yield in the community, but in any event the
trustee is chargeable with the interest actually received
by him. If it was his duty to make investments which
pay a certain rate of interest, he will be charged that
rate, even though it is higher than the legal or current
rates of return. Ordinarily a failure simply to invest
renders him liable for interest at the current rate of
return on trust investments rather than the legal rate of
interest. There are three general situations which are
held to warrant charging compound interest: where the
trustee himself has received compound interest, where he
has received a profit which cannot be ascertained but is
presumably at least equal to compound interest, and
where it was his duty to accumulate the income. The
decisions of courts of different jurisdictions are in irreconcilable conflict on this matter, both because of the difference in their fundamental attitudes and the almost
imperceptible shades of distinction which may be drawn
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between the conduct of different trustees.3 6 In an early
case, Barney v. Saunders et al.,37 the United States Supreme Court remarked that "interest is compounded as
a punishment, or as a measure of damages for undisclosed profits and in place of them." However, the
theory behind most recent decisions is simply to make
the plaintiff whole, rather than to penalize or punish the
defendant for a reprehensible act. In the Minnesota case,
St. Paul Trust Company v. Strong et al., mentioned
above, the decision of the lower court was modified to
award simple interest, instead of compound, the court being of opinion that a trustee who mingles trust funds
with his own money or uses them in his private business
should be charged simple interest at the legal rate where
there has been no fraud or flagrant breach of trust. Illinois, however, considers such practices sufficiently "flagrant" in themselves, judging from the cases of Asay v.
Allen et al.38 and Hough v. Harvey et al." The statutes
of some states expressly limit the allowance of compound
interest to cases in which the trustee is guilty of a willful
breach of trust. However, a rigid rule seems less salutary than a consistent holding to the theorytat no remedy should be adopted which gives the wrongdoing trustee any advantage from his own breach of trust.
AUTHORIZATION OF PARTICIPATING INVESTMENTS
One of the most striking features brought to mind by
a casual review of this subject is that the ten thousand
commandments for trustees, like their prototypes, are all
negative. In the more or less theoretical realm of the

controlling legal principles, which place their limitations
on the administration of trusts, it is not often that the
question arises, "What can the trustee do?" To one not
i6

See discussion of this situation in 14
U. S. 535, 14 L. Ed. 1047 (1853).

3757
38

124 Ill.
391, 16 N. E. 865 (1888).

39 71 I11. 72 (1873).
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in actual contact with the workaday world of this business, the occasion for such an inquiry may not appear
manifest. However, the facts are that a technically
precise application of those principles creates restraints
on conduct which make for inconvenience, waste, loss of
profits, and inefficiency which affect all concerned. The
reported decisions deal only with cases where the trustee
is charged with having left his prescribed path. The
loss to trust estates caused by an over-rigorous adherence to that narrow route does not receive such publicity. Remedies for this condition have been suggested
and adopted in several states in the form of "participating" or "contributory" investments. Sometimes the
suggestion comes from the courts in the form of language
which may be construed as a plea for some such reform.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, where, as in Illinois,
there is no such statutory innovation, in a recent case
held a purchase of a bond from another trust estate of
which the defendant was trustee to be an improper investment, as it was not called to the attention of all the
interested parties. The court said:
We can readily see how a large trust company may find it
necessary to sell a high-grade security for one of its trusts, and
it may have funds for investment in another trust. Securities
such as mortgage bonds, etc., as a rule are unlisted and there
is no market price for them. Sometimes good securities are
scarce. The trust company, acting in good faith, may deem
it advisable to make the sale and purchase. It nevertheless
is acting for both buyer and seller, and the transaction, if
attacked, will be set aside on failure of the trustee to show
absence of any irregularity or of any personal benefit to itself.
It must also show that, at the time of the transfer, the sale,
purchase, and price
were advantageous and fair to the various
40
interested trusts.
Participating mortgages, used for many years in
financing loans, may consist simply of a single mortgage
40

Roberts et al. v. Michigan Trust Co. et al., 273 Mich. 91, 262 N. W.

744 (1935).
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in which investors purchase interests and receive certificates of participation. They have been authorized by
statute as investments for trust funds in California,
Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. In those jurisdictions a trust company may
have on hand for investment $500 of the funds of one
trust, $17,500 of another, and $130,000 of a third; it
could then purchase a $200,000 mortgage, allocate its
proportionate interest to each trust, and treat itself on
its books as the owner of the remaining $52,000 interest.
The same general scheme may be achieved in a more complex fashion if the trust company has a group of mortgages against which it issues participation certificates to
several trusts held by it. Another variation is for the
particular trustee to purchase the certificates from another trustee who is handling the distribution for the
mortgage loan company, and so obtain, rather than a lien
on realty, a right in equity to compel another trustee to
enforce various mortgages. The case of In re Peene's
Will41 gives an interesting history of the New York case
and statutory law on this subject.
it. is urged in behalf of this practice that the participation certificates can be of small denominations, and so
furnish ready investment for odd amounts of trust income or principal which may be on hand. The advantage
over requiring the trustee to search for a single small
mortgage suited to his trust is obvious. Besides the convenience, it increases diversification and spreading of the
risk. The plan is hardly distinguishable in theory from
purchasing bonds of public utility corporations which are
secured by a single mortgage to a trustee, and such have
been validated as trust investments in many states.
On the other hand arguments are advanced against
such investments. In the first place the cardinal rule that
trust funds must be earmarked and kept separate from
41

279 N. Y. S. 131 (1935).
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other trust and non-trust property is violated, and the
investments of each individual trust cannot be supervised
for the sole benefit of that estate. It is also pointed out
that it is considerably more difficult for the trustee to
make sure that there is the proper margin of security
for the mortgages in which he holds an interest and to
be sure that it is maintained. The truth of these objections cannot be disputed; it is simply a question of
whether the arguments of convenience and necessity are
sufficiently strong to overcome them. Moreover, there
are other objections that can be guarded against in statutory enactments. Certainly there should be a provision
against the trustee for the mortgage company having
power to substitute mortgages, make extensions, or grant
releases without consultation with the holders, as such
would be a highly objectionable delegation of discretionary powers. It would also seem desirable to require the
investing trustee to purchase such investments from
third parties to remove such a conflict with its individual
interest. They hardly seem to be adapted to use by
natural persons as trustees because of the complications
involved when such a sole trustee dies. Also corporate
trustees are subject to governmental regulation, and may
be expected to have greater financial responsibility. Furthermore, it would certainly be advisable to provide expressly that the 'certificates which are allotted to trusts
shall not be junior to any others, and that the value of
the issue shall not exceed the face of the mortgage.
Another plan which has considerable support is the
so-called "capital accumulation trust." The practice in
its fundamentals is commonplace everywhere. Savings
bank deposits, building and loan participations, mortgages held by a trustee for the common security of bond
holders, and life insurance policies are familiar applications of the principle. As applied to trusts the trustee
holds all its trust investments as a block and issues cer.
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tificates of interest in that common fund. The practice is
to measure the participation therein by units instead of
in money. The units are usually revalued every month
by the trustee in accordance with a formula contained
in the trust instrument with a view of facilitating additions and withdrawals. The trustee is forbidden to invest the common fund otherwise than through the units
of participation, and thus can have no interest adverse to
the beneficiaries.
All investments, no matter how conservative, fluctuate
in value, and the principal virtue claimed for this type
of trust is that it avoids this effect. The continual revaluation of the units would prevent the fund from failing through withdrawals, and so those cestuis who permit
their funds to remain in times of stress are not injured
by the withdrawals of others. It is clear that measurement in units makes liquidation, as well as management,
much simpler. It is claimed that this feature is a stabilizing influence in times of heavy liquidation of securities.
It is also pointed out that an equitable distribution of
earned surplus is achieved which is never the case in
other types of deposit. There s a definite tendency toward authorizing trust companies to create such funds.
They have been provided for in the statutes of Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Vermont. This also indicates an attempt to protect
trust estates against over-protection. This scheme or
something similar can probably be expected to become
quite prevalent in the future. It is one of the recognized
virtues of our legal system that it is able to overcome inflexibility and adapt itself to new needs and growing
conditions. Perhaps before another major depression
occurs we shall see the practice of employing a trustee
become more universal than that of securing an investment banking house to sell at a profit'to itself.

